T1DF financial report for year ending June 2019 - 100% individually funded, huge increase in public support

 

T1DF remains 100% funded by individuals.

On August 15 T1DF released its draft financial report for the accounting year ending June 30, 2019. T1DF’s revenues for the accounting year beginning July 1, 2018, including donated services, amounted to $35,077.

T1DF remains 100% funded by individual donors, with more than 200 new donors contributing in the past year. We accept no funding from manufacturers, PBMs, or insurance companies, which allows us to remain independent from industry influence.

We are grateful to every person who has supported our work financially.

T1DF meets IRS’s “public support” test for 501(c)(3)s.

Thanks to your generosity, in this past fiscal year T1DF met the IRS’s “public support” test for 501(c)(3)s, with 63% of cash revenues coming from the general public ($34 average donation). Additional revenues were provided in the form of services donated by T1DF’s officers and board members. 

The programs your support makes possible.

Over the past year, your support has helped T1DF achieve important work in litigation and beyond:

  • Protecting patients’ ability to bring claims in federal court against PBMs and insurers related to the pricing of insulin, glucagon, and blood glucose test strips. In New Jersey federal court, the Type 1 Diabetes Defense Foundation and its president Julia Boss successfully unconsolidated their insulin pricing lawsuit and then withdrew without prejudice the claims of Boss v. CVS Health (Civil Action No. 17-01823) and their claims in the related cases Bewley v. CVS Health (glucagon) and Prescott v. CVS Health (test strips). The Voluntary Dismissal countered a Tolling and Standstill Agreement entered into between fourteen law firms, including In re Insulin Pricing Litigation’s interim co-lead counsel and Keller Rohrback, the MSP Plaintiffs (payers), and PBM Defendants (agents and subsidiaries of payers). By voluntarily dismissing Boss v. CVS Health in its entirety, the Foundation Plaintiffs prevented conflicted plaintiffs’ attorneys in In re Insulin Pricing Litigation from settling the Boss case’s PBM/payer claims—a necessary step towards refiling an augmented complaint in a more suitable forum.

  • Docket monitoring, reporting to the public and alerting reporters about developments in other cases related to insulin pricing, including the federal securities case filed in New Jersey on behalf of Novo Nordisk investors, the Minnesota Attorney General’s case against manufacturers (now facing a scathing motion to dismiss in New Jersey federal court), and claims against manufacturers filed in state court by the Attorney General of Kentucky. T1DF spent $1,392 on PACER court records fees alone over the past year, nearly 15% of our cash budget. We have also filed public document requests in Minnesota and Kentucky.

  • Seeking information, over a two-year period, from Eli Lilly’s glucagon product lead regarding delays to market availability for intranasal glucagon. Given many states’ ongoing restriction on injected glucagon administration by non-nursing staff in K-12 settings, nasal glucagon availability is a consumer protection issue with significant implications for the civil rights of students with type 1 diabetes. Following on the FDA’s approval of the long-delayed application filed by Eli Lilly in July 2018—26 years after the initial application for the relevant patent by Novo Nordisk and nearly 3 years after Lilly acquired worldwide rights from Locemia Solutions to its nasal glucagon (then already in Phase III trials)—T1DF filed a FOIA request with the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) seeking further clarification regarding these unconscionable delays. T1DF’s position is that nasal glucagon should be available free (with the purchase of the insulin that causes severe hypoglycemia, the side effect glucagon is designed to treat) or at a reasonable list price pegged to production cost (i.e. list price no more than $25).

  • Intervening in the EpiPen MDL in Kansas in January 2019 to alert the Court to crucial issues of conflict between members of a joint payer-patient class being proposed by class action counsel. This is a critical drug pricing litigation that could have a precedential impact on all future cases involving heavily rebated brand drugs, such as analog insulins. T1DF’s prior drug pricing litigation has been cited in EpiPen MDL court filings as the only example of vigorous pro-patient litigation currently taking place on U.S. drug pricing, logically incorporating claims against third-party-payers who receive rebates, not only the manufacturers who pay them. No other patient organization has intervened in the EpiPen case to protect patients’ interest from class action attorneys who have extensive past and present client relationships with third-party payers. T1DF has been the sole patient representative attending class certification hearings or on case management calls, an important function in a case where litigation counsel have made repeated efforts to seal documents and camouflage patent conflicts of interest between patients and the third-party payers that now receive large rebates but base patient cost-sharing on inflated list prices. The Court is expected to rule on class certification in this case sometime after October 2019. 

  • Playing a key patient advocacy role in the HIPAA-named DMSO National Council for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP), urging industry actors to revise NCPDP’s communication standards for pharmacy transactions to facilitate point-of-sale rebate pass-through to beneficiaries in Medicare Part D and commercial insurance plans. T1DF’s policy director Charles Fournier was the sole patient representative in the 15-person workgroup drafting NCPDP’s comment on the proposed chargeback rule for Medicare Part D, and earlier this month T1DF opposed payers’ attempts to roll back these improvements. T1DF continues in its watchdog function, reiterating to NCPDP’s members that they are obligated to create transaction standards that allow for all lawful transactions, not only those transactions preferred by their dominant insurer members.

Growing T1DF’s financial base to sustain our litigation program.

T1DF’s work for affordable patient access to pharmaceuticals that are already heavily rebated to insurers, large employer plans, and Part D plan sponsors can continue, and expand, only with your ongoing support. T1DF has had considerable impact in our David-and-Goliath challenge to a status quo that’s putting patient lives at stake, but our ability to intervene in litigation remains limited by budgetary constraints.

T1DF’s fundraising performance should rebound in 2020 as we expect to resume active litigation against health insurers and their PBM subsidiaries, and to benefit from renewed public and media interest in practical and equitable solutions. Our goal is to reach $100,000 in annual revenues from individual donations in order to sustain a full-blown litigation program against the full range of corporate actors now engaged in anti-competitive price-fixing actions, injuring patients who need insulin to live. 

To stay on top of breaking news, please follow us on Twitter @T1DF_advocacy, or join our email list for updates (send subject line SUBSCRIBE to info@t1df.org). If you are able, please make a gift today to the only independent U.S. nonprofit that’s solely dedicated to advancing the consumer and civil rights of people with insulin-dependent diabetes.


About T1DF

Oregon-based 501(c)(3) nonprofit Type 1 Diabetes Defense Foundation is America's only legal advocacy organization dedicated to advancing equal rights and opportunities for Americans with type 1 and other forms of insulin dependent diabetes. T1DF accepts no funding from the pharmaceutical, medical device, pharmacy benefit management, or insurance industries, nor from any organization they fund or any investment fund or any other corporate actor with interest in healthcare. We support regulatory frameworks in which manufacturers compete directly on innovation and price to consumers and where drug channel actors can engage in open and efficient price arbitraging, without price discrimination and asymmetries of information. Annual report available here.